The article deals with a recent attack by Sam Harris on two famous arguments that purport to establish a gap between factual and evaluative statements-Hume's Is-Ought Problem and Moore's Open Question Argument. I present the arguments, analyze the relationship between them and critically assess Harris' attempt to refute them. I conclude that Harris' attempt fails.
Introduction
I believe it would not be an exaggeration to say that one of the most influential arguments and challenges in analytic ethics of the past century has been the Open Question Argument by G. E. Moore. Facing Moore's challenge seems to be a precondition of a successful theory of metaethics. And understandably so. If successful, the argument would show a rather disappointing thing: the good, by many taken to be the central ethical concept, cannot be defined. It is a concept that admits of no analysis and the corresponding property of goodness resists any reduction to some more elementary and perhaps more homely properties. Moore's ideas about the meaning of the predicate good are closely related to David Hume's famous statement that one cannot derive an ought statement from an is statement-the IsOught Problem. In this paper I first want to formulate precisely both claims and show the relationship between them. Then, I will focus on a recent attack on Hume and Moore by the American neuroscientist Sam Harris, who claims that the challenge they pose is merely a "verbal trap" (Harris 2010, 6 ). I will assess his ideas related to the two arguments and claim that he fails to meet their challenges.
The Is-Ought Problem and the Open Question Argument
David Hume formulated the Is-Ought Problem in his work A Treatise of Human Nature, where he says: HUMAN AFFAIRS 21, 262-271, 2011 DOI: 10.2478 In every system of morality, which I have hitherto met with, I have always remarked, that the author proceeds for some time in the ordinary ways of reasoning, and establishes the being of a God, or makes observations concerning human affairs; when all of a sudden I am surprised to find, that instead of the usual copulations of propositions, is, and is not, I meet with no proposition that is not connected with an ought, or an ought not. This change is imperceptible; but is however, of the last consequence. For as this ought, or ought not, expresses some new relation or affirmation, 'tis necessary that it should be observed and explained; and at the same time that a reason should be given; for what seems altogether inconceivable, how this new relation can be a deduction from others, which are entirely different from it (Hume 2003, T3.1.1.27 ).
Read at face value, Hume seems to be claiming no more than that it is necessary to explain how statements that contain the modal verb ought can be logically derived from statements that contain the verb is, as these are distinct relations. However, the dominant historical interpretation of this passage seems to attribute to Hume the following reading:
• No statement containing the modal verb ought can be logically derived from a set of premises only containing the verb is. And this has further been interpreted as: • No evaluative statement can be derived from a set of purely factual premises.
The relationship between the two interpretations may not be immediately obvious. It is easier to imagine what facts have to do with is statements. But what do evaluative statements have to do with ought statements? The link is provided by the doctrine of internalism, which claims that there is a conceptual connection between evaluative terms such as good and action guidance. In other words, part of the meaning of This is good and other positively evaluative propositions is the proposition It ought to be done. It is sometimes said that the concept of good has ought-to-be-doneness built into it. And, of course, part of the meaning of negatively evaluative propositions such as This is bad is the proposition that It ought not be done. If that is the case, it follows that if you cannot logically derive an ought statement from a set of is statements, then you cannot derive an evaluative statement such as This is good from a set of is statements, that is, factual statements.
I do not wish to enter the debate on whether these interpretations of Hume are actually correct and I will assume that the Is-Ought Problem is a logical problem that has to be faced regardless of the issue of Hume's authorship. The problem that is posed here for moral investigation is that ethics seems to be primarily concerned with what ought to be the case. If the Is-Ought problem is a genuine one, it seems to follow that the conclusions of normative theories, the norms prescribing how one ought to act, cannot be logically justified by an appeal to facts only. There will always have to be at least one evaluative premise in the set of premises entailing the evaluative statement in question.
Before predicate N. 5. Thus, the predicate good cannot be synonymous with the natural predicate N. 6. Thus, the property of goodness cannot be identical to the property of N (Moore, Baldwin 1993, 66-68) . Let me now illustrate how the argument attacks the opponents by using an example. Suppose that, inspired by a crude form of Hedonism, we associate the good with the physically pleasurable. Then the fact that the thing is physically pleasurable must be part of the meaning of good. So anyone who asked whether what is physically pleasurable is also good could not be asking an open question. But the question of whether what is physically pleasurable is good is open. One can ask, for instance, "Well, I know that having sex with a dolphin might be physically pleasurable, but is it actually good?" and not betray a misunderstanding of the concept of good. Thus, the predicate good cannot be synonymous with the natural predicate physically pleasurable and the property of goodness cannot be identical to physical pleasure.
What is the relationship between Hume's and Moore's arguments? Both establish a certain autonomy of the central ethical concepts or the values. While Hume seems to claim that one cannot infer that a thing or an act is valuable if one does not already accept other values and base that inference on some of them, Moore believes that values cannot be identified at the conceptual level with any non-evaluative concept, or any other concept, for that matter. Both arguments thus establish the fact-value dualism, a gap that a great many philosophers have attempted to bridge ever since.
Before I go on to assess Harris' attack on the Is-Ought Problem and the Open Question Argument, let me make two points. The first point is that both arguments are believed to have driven a wedge between science and ethics. Science, by definition, is the study of the way the world is, the study of facts. The arguments seem to show that these facts cannot be used on their own to draw conclusions about what ought to be the case-the domain of ethics. Some values have to be presupposed. They also indicate that values cannot be identified with facts. That is why the two arguments have frequently been utilized by moral sceptics and relativists, who conclude (wrongly, in my opinion) that the arguments show that values are completely arbitrary. This is the starting point for Harris, who believes that science can and must determine value, as it is absolutely objective.
The second point outlines my critical strategy. Moore's and Hume's arguments are similar but distinct ventures and answering one of them may not have any direct bearing on the soundness of the other. In particular, I believe that even if one is able to specify a statement about the nature of the good that does not lead to an open question, one cannot directly conclude that evaluative statements can be logically derived from factual statements. This is, I believe, the fallacy that Harris commits.
Harris' Attack on the Arguments
Harris is a key figure in what's called the New Science of Morality-a scientific movement that attempts to use the methodology and findings of empirical sciences to shed light on problems of ethics which have traditionally been approached in an a priori way. It encompasses sciences such as neuroscience, cognitive science, social psychology, evolutionary biology, and primatology, which are driven by the idea that through the careful and systematic study of the brain processes, cognitive and emotional reactions and biological foundations that underlie our behaviour, we can learn about a specific kind of our social behaviour-morality. Some scientists attempt to shed light on morality by explaining its origins, while others focus on the neurological mechanisms of moral decision making and valuing and still others on the social phenomena affecting our moral decisions. There is little doubt that the understanding of morality that this descriptive approach brings is valuable. One thought, however, remains controversial even among scholars who share the optimism in the application of scientific methods to the study of morality. That is the question of whether we can draw normative conclusions from empirical findings. They are divided on the issue of whether science can meet the challenge posed by Hume and Moore. Jonathan Haidt and Joshua Greene, for instance, represent those who, generally speaking, believe that the proper role of the science of morality is to study different moral systems, the processes they emerge from and the mechanisms they depend upon. It is not, however, in the authority of science to prescribe which of those systems are preferable and what values we ought to pursue.
In strong opposition to these views the American neuroscientist Sam Harris claims that science can and must reveal the right moral norms and that it is high time science took over the domain traditionally controlled by a priori disciplines. In his latest book The Moral Landscape: How Science Can Determine Human Values (Harris 2010) he argues that questions of value are objectively true or false and places ethics within the framework of the methodology of science. He criticizes his fellow scientists for refusing to take a stand on issues Harris regards as obviously immoral, such as female circumcision or the wearing of burqas, and which, as Harris believes to have shown, can be scientifically proven to be such.
Harris claims the Is-Ought Problem is a mere "verbal trap" and that while it might hold for properties such as promoting physical pleasure the argument fails when we accept the idea that questions about values, meaning, purpose and morality are in fact questions about the well-being of conscious creatures (Harris 2010, 7-8) . If that were so, the following claim would have to be true: The statement Act A promotes the well-being of conscious creatures entails the statement We ought to perform act A (Act A is good) without an additional prescriptive or evaluative premise. An immediate objection is that the conclusion simply does not follow and what is needed is the premise that the well-being of conscious creatures is valuable, or that value can be defined as the well-being of conscious creatures. The explanation is, I believe, not that Harris is ignorant of elementary logic. Rather, he believes that the additional assumption is simply too obvious to be worth discussing, that the question of whether the well-being of conscious creatures is good is, pace Moore, not open. In fact, Harris says, slightly dramatically, that anyone who believes that our well-being is not valuable is plainly wrong and should not be invited to the next scientific conference-to use Harris' phrase-just as we would refuse to invite people who believe the Sun goes around the Earth to an astronomy conference. Certain opinions simply do not count.
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Let us see now how this premise functions in Harris' argument to obtain the conclusion that science can answer questions of value: 1. The only valuable thing is the well-being of conscious creatures. 2. The well-being of conscious creatures is a natural fact. 3. Science can describe natural facts. 4. Thus, science can describe what contributes to the well-being of conscious creatures. 5. Thus, science can determine what has value.
The crucial premises are the first two statements relating value to well-being and reducing well-being to a natural fact. Let us see how Harris argues in their favour.
As for the first statement, Harris claims that consciousness is the only intelligible domain of value, since a thing that bears no relationship to the actual or potential experiences of conscious creatures would be the least interesting thing in the universe. Without potential consequences at the level of experience-happiness, suffering, joy, despair-all talk of value is empty. The only thing we can reasonably value is the well-being of conscious creatures, thus the concept of value is exhausted by the concept of our well-being. Once Harris establishes the relationship between value and well-being, he can go on to argue his second premise:
Harris believes that human well-being is an objective feature of the world which entirely depends on the state of the human brain and events in the world. He uses the example of the difference between the worst possible life-life of fear, despair, uncertainty, violence and hunger-and the best possible life-one of abundance, opportunity, career, health and wealth, and claims that the difference is a difference in the facts of the world and their effects on the experiences of conscious creatures and thus it is a difference that can be described by natural science. Harris believes that the mere recognition that there is a difference in the value of these two life scenarios is fully sufficient to conclude that science can, at least in principle, determine the mechanisms that lead to a good life. Of course, science cannot work out every single detail of the concept of well-being, but that does not make it an unscientific concept. Harris likes to make use of the concept of health as an analogy. Health is a concept about as vague as well-being. There are still right and wrong answers about what facts determine good health, facts that can and must be studied by science. Like health, well-being is a natural fact which transcends culture (Harris 2010, chapters 1-2) .
So now we come to the conclusion that if value is well-being and if well-being is a natural fact, then science can determine values and the gap between facts and values has been bridged. Well, are the premises true?
First of all, we could, I believe, reasonably deny Harris' first premise, for the definition of value seems to be too narrow. Harris believes that the concept of value is exhausted by the well-being of conscious creatures. That means that if a thing does not increase the well-being of conscious creatures, it is of no value. But this claim has been denied and things unrelated to our well-being have been assigned value. Aldo Leopold, for instance, has argued that value is not human-centred (or conscious creature-centred); in his conception of Land Ethic things are assigned value in proportion to their tendency to preserve the integrity, stability, and beauty of the biotic community (Leopold 2005, 501-510) . There is a heated debate going on in the Czech Republic right now about our right to interfere in the national parks. The largest-Šumava National Park-has repeatedly had problems with the proliferation of the bark beetle, threatening to destroy large portions of forests. On the basis of scientific evidence, the opposing sides in the dispute argue over the potential rate of damage and natural renewal. Although the arguments are primarily driven by economic and political reasons, some arguments focus on the rationale underlying the construction of national parks. Both sides believe the heritage the park protects is immensely valuable. They differ, however, with respect to the question of whether the value is intrinsic or instrumental. Some people involved claim that the heritage of national parks is intended for the benefit of people, thus interfering with the park ecosystem to prevent the spread of the bark beetle is fully justified. Others believe that what is valuable is the ecosystem itself, regardless of whether man benefits from it or not, and that the bark beetle is a natural member of the ecosystem. A statement from the Biodiversity Research Center of the Czech Academy of Sciences for instance reads: "Natural forests in protected areas are valuable simply because they have existed and developed independently of man, some for thousands of years."
4 Any interference with the natural processes constituting the ecosystem is thus considered wrong. As we can see, one side relates the value to our actual and potential experiences, the other does not. If these ideas are right, Harris has perhaps specified a sufficient condition for value. If an act promotes the well-being of conscious creatures, it is valuable. But the condition may not be necessary. We cannot claim that if a thing does not promote the well-being of conscious creatures, it has no value: the spheres of value may include more than our well-being. Notice, however, that by specifying the sufficient condition only, it is still possible to answer Moore's Open Question Argument. That is because if promoting the well-being of conscious creatures is sufficient for it to be valuable, Harris might still plausibly claim that the question "Is whatever promotes the well-being of conscious creatures good?" is conceptually closed. It seems then that the Open Question Argument can be met in two ways. The bold way would be to find a naturalist analysis of the predicate good, that is, to provide both a sufficient and a necessary condition for a state of affairs to be good or to identify goodness with a natural property. The cheap way would be to specify merely one of the sufficient conditions of goodness-the question of whether that property is good will still be closed. What I would like to show next, however, is that meeting the Open Question Argument this way does nothing to meet the challenge of deriving values from facts or, as Harris puts it, of determining values by science.
Let's then proceed to Harris' central claim that science can determine values. The belief that scientific methodology is capable of arriving at a conception of universal value also obviously depends on how one defines scientific methodology. The crucial question is whether scientific methodology is to be limited to observation, the construction of hypotheses and conducting empirical experiments to confirm or refute them. Harris seems to be suggesting this narrow conception when he makes fun of standard meta-ethical theories dealing with the nature of value and moral facts in a non-empirical fashion, saying: "I am convinced that every appearance of terms like "metaethics," "deontology," "noncognitivism," "antirealism," "emotivism," etc., directly increases the amount of boredom in the universe" (Harris 2010, 124) .
If science is construed in such a narrow way, however, Harris' claim is certainly false. What kind of empirical experiment could we conduct to decide between those who think that value only relates to mental states of humans and other conscious creatures and those who believe value derives from the function in ecosystems?
Or consider another issue that is related to Harris' definition of good. Who exactly falls under the extension of the concept of conscious creature? Are we talking about the conscious creatures that presently exist only, or should our moral norms also cover future generations. Does the well-being of future conscious creatures count as much as ours, or can we just free ride at their expense? Some people believe we have no obligations to future people as they do not exist yet, we do not know their preferences, and because we are influencing their identity.
It makes no sense to apply Harris' criterion of value to these questions and say things like the well-being of future generations matters because it contributes to the well-being of conscious creatures. It just begs the question that non-conscious creatures only have value insofar as they contribute to the well-being of conscious creatures. The reason why we encounter these problems is quite simple. Harris' identification of value with that which promotes the well-being of conscious creatures is not the empirical result of a scientific experiment; it has not been derived from empirical facts. It is an a priori stipulation expressing Harris' personal preference about the way that the concept of value should be used. In fact, Harris justifies his preference by an appeal to another value-rationality-when he says that the well-being of conscious creatures is the only thing we can reasonably value (Harris 2010, 7) . Thus, the identification of science with empirical experimentation leads to an inconsistency in Harris' conception: the claim that value is to be determined by science is inconsistent with his initial stipulation. It also leads to a vindication, rather than a refutation, of the Is-Ought Problem. Harris has only been able to establish the well-being of conscious creatures as a sufficient condition for value on the basis of another value-rationality.
To be fair to Harris, he does attempt to answer my challenge. He says that this evaluative precondition of an empirical inquiry into well-being is no different from the evaluative preconditions that our other scientific theories rest on. The notion of a scientific fact, for instance, is based on values such as logical consistency, commitment to truth, honesty, theoretical economy, etc. (ibid.). Such presuppositions, however, do not make science unscientific or open to relativization.
The problem with this answer is that although the dependence on values does not make science unscientific, neither does it show that the values are determined by the scientific methodology itself. Analogically to my previous questions we could ask, if there is a value conflict, what fact in the world that could be observed, measured and quantified makes it true that explanatory power is a more important value than theoretical economy, or vice versa. The reliance of science on values does not show, pace Harris, that the fact-value dichotomy collapses. What it shows is what it is: science presupposes values that cannot be determined by scientific methodology, if construed narrowly.
The move that can be made is to broaden the conception of science to that of all rational and non-dogmatic inquiry, basically putting science in opposition to Harris' greatest foereligion. 6 In that sense, science includes a priori disciplines such as philosophy and ethics. And there is evidence to suggest that Harris seems to be aware of the necessity of this step. He says, for instance: "I think we can know, through reason alone, that consciousness is the only intelligible domain of value" (Harris 2010, 20) .
That move, however, makes Harris' bold claim that science can answer questions of value a much less interesting thesis and one that should not, I believe, deserve such attention in intellectual circles: dealing with moral issues in a rational, open and non-dogmatic way has always been a distinctive feature of serious philosophical inquiry.
7 Science has frequently played an important role in supplying ethics with empirical information about the impact of things on conscious creatures, about things that cause pain and suffering, about things that promote comfort and increase pleasure. For example, DDT had long been considered an efficient pesticide and was widely utilized in agriculture, until it was discovered in the 1960s that it is toxic to humans as well as some sea animals and birds. This was a scientific discovery and it led to the widely-shared belief that the indiscriminate use of DDT is harmful and resulted in the world-wide restriction of its use under the Stockholm Convention of 2001. The detrimental effects of DDT were, of course, a scientific discovery. The immorality of its use was not. One can easily imagine the community having come to the decision that the amount of contamination, although considerable, was outweighed by the increase in agricultural productivity. The community could have shown that it valued slightly shorter lives with more available food, to longer lives with less available food. Examples like this one show us, I believe, the proper role of empirical science in moral inquiry-of assistant and information provider. Science can tell us how to achieve our goals once we establish what those goals are. Science can tell us what facts in the world need to be changed in order for our preferences to be satisfied. Or it could show us, once the process of moral decision-making is fully understood, what incentives to use to motivate people to act morally. Science, however, has little say in determining our preferences. And while I believe like Harris that there are objective differences between the worst possible life and the best possible one, to attack the hard-core relativists who deny this is to attack a straw man. In fact, moral disputes are much subtler than Harris takes them to be. There are people who find happiness in the fulfilment of desires and there are others who believe happiness consists in the suppression or elimination of desires. Presented with such subtle dilemmas, Harris' conclusion that empirical science can play a dominant role in the determination of our values does not follow. What seems to follow most is that the new science of morality, now taken more generally than just Harris' personal work, will make an invaluable contribution to the understanding of the phenomenon of morality. Thus, I believe that the Is-Ought Problem has been untouched by Harris' conception and his direct attack on the Open Question Argument has succeeded only superficially.
